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Replication data for: Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Anukriti, S
Publication Date
2018-04-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter. Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the fertility-sex ratio conflict.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20150234 (Text)
Publications
  • Anukriti, S. “Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10, no. 2 (April 2018): 27–57. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150234.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.20150234 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Anukriti, S (2018): Replication data for: Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113647V1