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Replication data for: Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Asher, Sam
  • Novosad, Paul
Publication Date
2017-01-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Political favoritism affects the allocation of government resources, but is it consequential for growth? Using a close election regression discontinuity design and data from India, we measure the local economic impact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party. Favoritism leads to higher private sector employment, higher share prices of firms, and increased output as measured by night lights; the three effects are similar and economically substantive. Finally, we present evidence that politicians influence firms primarily through control over the implementation of regulation.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20150512 (Text)
Publications
  • Asher, Sam, and Paul Novosad. “Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9, no. 1 (January 2017): 229–73. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150512.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.20150512 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Asher, Sam; Novosad, Paul (2017): Replication data for: Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113667V1