Replication data for: Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India
- Asher, Sam
- Novosad, Paul
AbstractPolitical favoritism affects the allocation of government resources, but is it consequential for growth? Using a close election regression discontinuity design and data from India, we measure the local economic impact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party. Favoritism leads to higher private sector employment, higher share prices of firms, and increased output as measured by night lights; the three effects are similar and economically substantive. Finally, we present evidence that politicians influence firms primarily through control over the implementation of regulation.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/app.20150512 (Text)
Asher, Sam, and Paul Novosad. “Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9, no. 1 (January 2017): 229–73. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150512.
- ID: 10.1257/app.20150512 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 3 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12