Replication data for: Adverse Selection in ACA Exchange Markets: Evidence from Colorado
- Panhans, Matthew
AbstractThis study tests for adverse selection in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) health insurance exchanges established in 2014 and quantifies the welfare consequences. Using a new statewide dataset of medical claims from Colorado, I use plausibly exogenous premium variation generated by geographic discontinuities to test for selection. Specifically, each $1 increase in monthly premiums causes a $0.85–0.95 increase in annual medical expenditures of the insured population in 2014, with attenuated effects in 2015. These estimates are consistent with the prevalence of chronic conditions and difference-in-differences estimates. The results offer the first quasi-experimental evidence of adverse selection in the ACA markets.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/app.20170117 (Text)
Panhans, Matthew. “Adverse Selection in ACA Exchange Markets: Evidence from Colorado.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11, no. 2 (April 2019): 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20170117.
- ID: 10.1257/app.20170117 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12