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Replication data for: Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Deserranno, Erika
Publication Date
2019-01-01
Description
  • Abstract

    I study the role of financial incentives as signals of job characteristics when these are unknown to potential applicants. To this end, I create experimental variation in expected earnings and use that to estimate the effect of financial incentives on candidates' perception of a brand-new health-promoter position in Uganda and on the resulting size and composition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a lower positive externality for the community and discourage agents with strong pro-social preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract more applicants and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better.
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20170670 (Text)
Publications
  • Deserranno, Erika. “Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11, no. 1 (January 2019): 277–317. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20170670.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.20170670 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Deserranno, Erika (2019): Replication data for: Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113735