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Replication data for: Microfinance Games

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Giné, Xavier
  • Jakiela, Pamela
  • Karlan, Dean
  • Morduch, Jonathan
Publication Date
2010-07-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse. (JEL D82, G21, G31, O16)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.2.3.60 (Text)
Publications
  • Giné, Xavier, Pamela Jakiela, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Morduch. “Microfinance Games.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 3 (July 2010): 60–95. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.2.3.60.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.2.3.60 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Giné, Xavier; Jakiela, Pamela; Karlan, Dean; Morduch, Jonathan (2010): Replication data for: Microfinance Games. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113760