My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Jackson, C. Kirabo
  • Schneider, Henry S.
Publication Date
2011-07-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of agents in settings with incomplete contracts. Specifically, the study examines the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers due to moral hazard. Using within-driver variation and instrumental variable strategies to remove selection, we find that drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard, representing an improvement of almost one-half of a standard deviation of the outcome measures. Screening is ruled out as an explanation, and other mechanisms are investigated. (JEL D82, D86, L92, Z13)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.3.3.244 (Text)
Publications
  • Kirabo Jackson, C, and Henry S Schneider. “Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3, no. 3 (July 2011): 244–67. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.3.3.244.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.3.3.244 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Jackson, C. Kirabo; Schneider, Henry S. (2011): Replication data for: Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113794