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Replication data for: Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Almeida, Rita
  • Carneiro, Pedro
Publication Date
2012-07-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections, workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector. (JEL J31, J63, J88, K31, O15)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.4.3.64 (Text)
Publications
  • Almeida, Rita, and Pedro Carneiro. “Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4, no. 3 (July 2012): 64–89. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.4.3.64.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.4.3.64 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Almeida, Rita; Carneiro, Pedro (2012): Replication data for: Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113830V1