Replication data for: Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi
- Jack, B. Kelsey
AbstractEfficient targeting of public programs is difficult when the cost or benefit to potential recipients is private information. This study illustrates the potential of self-selection to improve allocational outcomes in the context of a program that subsidizes tree planting in Malawi. Landholders who received a tree planting contract as a result of bidding in an auction kept significantly more trees alive over a three year period than did landholders who received the contract through a lottery. The gains from targeting on private information through the auction represent a 30 percent cost savings per surviving tree for the implementing organization.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/app.5.3.113 (Text)
Jack, B. Kelsey. “Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 3 (July 2013): 113–35. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.5.3.113.
- ID: 10.1257/app.5.3.113 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12