Replication data for: Asymmetric Information between Employers
- Kahn, Lisa B.
AbstractThis study explores whether potential employers have the same information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction made by incumbent firms.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/app.5.4.165 (Text)
Kahn, Lisa B. “Asymmetric Information between Employers.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 4 (October 2013): 165–205. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.5.4.165.
- ID: 10.1257/app.5.4.165 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12