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Replication data for: Optimal Labor-Market Policy in Recessions

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Jung, Philip
  • Kuester, Keith
Publication Date
2014-12-30
Description
  • Abstract

    Within a search and matching model with risk-averse workers, endogenous hiring and separation, and unobservable search effort, we show how to decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation by a combination of a production tax and three labor-market policy instruments: vacancy subsidies, layoff taxes, and unemployment benefits. We derive analytical expressions for the optimal mix of these over the business cycle. Calibrating the model to the US economy under the assumption that wages are rigid, we find that hiring subsidies and layoff taxes should rise considerably and persistently in recessions. The optimal variation in unemployment benefits, in contrast, is quantitatively small and short-lived. (JEL E24, E32, J24, J63, J64, J65)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplemented by
    DOI: 10.1257/mac.20130028 (Text)
Publications
  • Jung, Philip, and Keith Kuester. “Optimal Labor-Market Policy in Recessions.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7, no. 2 (April 2015): 124–56. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20130028.
    • ID: 10.1257/mac.20130028 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2019-10-13 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Jung, Philip; Kuester, Keith (2014): Replication data for: Optimal Labor-Market Policy in Recessions. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114061V1