Replication data for: Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring
- Fuller, David L.
- Ravikumar, B.
- Zhang, Yuzhe
AbstractAn important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system. (JEL D82, H24, J64, J65)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/mac.20130255 (Text)
Fuller, David L., B. Ravikumar, and Yuzhe Zhang. “Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7, no. 2 (April 2015): 249–90. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20130255.
- ID: 10.1257/mac.20130255 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13