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Replication data for: Excessive Financing Costs in a Representative Agent Framework

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Eden, Maya
Publication Date
2015-12-31
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper highlights a pecuniary externality that results in excessive financing costs. Firms borrow to finance purchases of an inelastically supplied input, bidding up its price. Since higher input prices necessitate more debt obligations, this leads to an increase in intermediation costs. A quantitative interpretation of the model suggests that it is optimal to tax financial intermediation by increasing the borrowing rate by 3 percentage points. (JEL E13, E44, G21, G32, H21, H25)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplemented by
    DOI: 10.1257/mac.20140147 (Text)
Publications
  • Eden, Maya. “Excessive Financing Costs in a Representative Agent Framework.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 8, no. 2 (April 2016): 215–37. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20140147.
    • ID: 10.1257/mac.20140147 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2019-10-13 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Eden, Maya (2015): Replication data for: Excessive Financing Costs in a Representative Agent Framework. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114098