Replication data for: Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection
- Ševčík, Pavel
AbstractThis paper studies the joint dynamics of investor protection and economic development in a political economy model with capital accumulation and occupational choice. Less investor protection implies higher costs of external financing for entrepreneurs. This excludes poorer agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. The main determinants of investor protection policy preferences are the agent's net worth and the expected return from entrepreneurship. When the policy is chosen by the simple majority rule, the model generates several implications consistent with the observed variation of investor protection over time and across countries. (JEL D72, E22, E32, G18, G38, J24, L26)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.4.163 (Text)
Ševcík, Pavel. “Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4, no. 4 (October 2012): 163–97. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.4.4.163.
- ID: 10.1257/mac.4.4.163 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13