Replication data for: The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts
- Ardagna, Silvia
- Caselli, Francesco
AbstractWe review the events that led to the May 2010 and July 2011 bailout agreements. We interpret the bailouts as outcomes of political-economy equilibria. We argue that these equilibria were likely not on the Pareto frontier, and sketch political-economy arguments for why collective policymaking in the Euro area may lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/mac.6.4.291 (Text)
Ardagna, Silvia, and Francesco Caselli. “The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6, no. 4 (October 2014): 291–323. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.6.4.291.
- ID: 10.1257/mac.6.4.291 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13