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Replication data for: Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment

Resource Type
  • Gale, Douglas M.
  • Kariv, Shachar
Publication Date
  • Abstract

    This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders. The greater the incompleteness of the network, the more intermediation is required to transfer the assets between initial and final owners. The uncertainty of trade in networks constitutes a potentially important market friction. Nevertheless, we find the pricing behavior observed in the laboratory converges to competitive equilibrium behavior in a variety of treatments. However, the rate of convergence varies depending on the network, pricing rule, and payoff function. (JEL C91, C92, G10, G19)
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.114 (Text)
  • Gale, Douglas M, and Shachar Kariv. “Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1, no. 2 (July 2009): 114–32.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.1.2.114 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Gale, Douglas M.; Kariv, Shachar (2009): Replication data for: Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset.