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Replication data for: Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Kagel, John H.
  • McGee, Peter
Publication Date
2016-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results from the psychology literature. This quickly gives way to teams cooperating more than individuals. Team dialogues show increased payoffs from cooperation, along with anticipating opponents’ recognition of the same, provides the basis for cooperation, even while fully anticipating defection near the end game. A strong status quo bias in defecting across super-games limits unraveling. Defecting typically occurs one round earlier across super-games, consistent with low marginal, or even negative, benefits of more than one-step-ahead defection. (JEL C72, C73, C90, D12)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140068 (Text)
Publications
  • Kagel, John H., and Peter McGee. “Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8, no. 2 (May 2016): 253–76. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140068.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.20140068 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Kagel, John H.; McGee, Peter (2016): Replication data for: Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114333