My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All

Resource Type
  • Krishna, Kala
  • Tarasov, Alexander
Publication Date
  • Abstract

    This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving. (JEL H52, H75, I23, I28, J15, O15)
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140200 (Text)
  • Krishna, Kala, and Alexander Tarasov. “Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8, no. 2 (May 2016): 215–52.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.20140200 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Krishna, Kala; Tarasov, Alexander (2016): Replication data for: Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset.