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Replication data for: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Baranski, Andrzej
Publication Date
2016-11-01
Description
  • Abstract

    I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low.
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140240 (Text)
Publications
  • Baranski, Andrzej. “Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8, no. 4 (November 2016): 149–73. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140240.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.20140240 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Baranski, Andrzej (2016): Replication data for: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114338V1