Replication data for: Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling
- Bederson, Benjamin B.
- Jin, Ginger Zhe
- Leslie, Phillip
- Quinn, Alexander J.
- Zou, Ben
AbstractIn 2011, Maricopa County adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D). Using inspection results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58 percent of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality As. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and countersignaling: the better A restaurants use nondisclosure as a countersignal, while worse As and better Bs use disclosure to stand out from the other restaurants.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150178 (Text)
Bederson, Benjamin B., Ginger Zhe Jin, Phillip Leslie, Alexander J. Quinn, and Ben Zou. “Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, no. 1 (February 2018): 41–66. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150178.
- ID: 10.1257/mic.20150178 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13