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metadata language: English

Replication data for: Dynamic Noisy Signaling

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Heinsalu, Sander
Publication Date
2018-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This article studies costly signaling. The signaling effort is chosen in multiple periods and observed with noise. The signaler benefits from the belief of the market, not directly from the effort or the signal. Optimal signaling behavior in time-varying environments trades off effort-smoothing and influencing belief exactly when it yields a return. If the return to signaling first increases over time and then decreases, then the optimal effort rises slowly, reaches its maximum before the return does, and declines quickly. Advertising data displays this pattern.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160336 (Text)
Publications
  • Heinsalu, Sander. “Dynamic Noisy Signaling.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, no. 2 (May 2018): 225–49. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160336.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.20160336 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Heinsalu, Sander (2018): Replication data for: Dynamic Noisy Signaling. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114363