Replication data for: Competition in Treasury Auctions
- Elsinger, Helmut
- Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
- Zulehner, Christine
AbstractWe investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170039 (Text)
Elsinger, Helmut, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, and Christine Zulehner. “Competition in Treasury Auctions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 1 (February 2019): 157–84. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170039.
- ID: 10.1257/mic.20170039 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13