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Replication data for: Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard Meets Moral Preferences

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Andreoni, James
Publication Date
2018-11-01
Description
  • Abstract

    The fear of moral hazard—especially in the age of Internet commerce—can depress or prevent profitable trades. Experiments show, however, that many people prefer honesty to deceit and would not succumb to moral hazard. This paper asks a whether we can find a simple, voluntary institution that can empower moral traders, drive out amoral ones, reduce moral hazard, and restore profitable trade to markets. I find that selling goods with a "satisfaction guarantee," accompanied by potentially minor legal or reputational enforcement, allows moral preferences to defeat moral hazard.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170119 (Text)
Publications
  • Andreoni, James. “Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard Meets Moral Preferences.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, no. 4 (November 2018): 159–89. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170119.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.20170119 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Andreoni, James (2018): Replication data for: Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard Meets Moral Preferences. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114368