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Replication data for: Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Keane, Michael P.
  • Merlo, Antonio
Publication Date
2010-08-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the US Congress. These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, non-pecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that the effect of most policies varies considerably across different types of politicians. For example, a reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by "skilled" politicians, Democrats, and politicians who were relatively young when first elected, but not by politicians who most value legislative accomplishments ("achievers"). (JEL D72)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.3.186 (Text)
Publications
  • Keane, Michael P, and Antonio Merlo. “Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 3 (August 2010): 186–215. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.3.186.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.2.3.186 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Keane, Michael P.; Merlo, Antonio (2010): Replication data for: Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114374