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Replication data for: Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Eyster, Erik
  • Rabin, Matthew
Publication Date
2010-11-01
Description
  • Abstract

    In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that people naïvely believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private information. Naïve herders inadvertently over-weight early movers' private signals by neglecting that interim herders' actions also embed these signals. Such "social confirmation bias" leads them to herd with positive probability on incorrect actions even in extremely rich-information settings where rational players never do. Moreover, because they become fully confident even when wrong, naïve herders can be harmed, on average, by observing others. (JEL D82, D83)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.4.221 (Text)
Publications
  • Eyster, Erik, and Matthew Rabin. “Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 4 (November 2010): 221–43. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.4.221.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.2.4.221 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Eyster, Erik; Rabin, Matthew (2010): Replication data for: Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114377V1