Replication data for: Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
- Fox, Jeremy T.
- Bajari, Patrick
AbstractWe propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100 (Text)
Fox, Jeremy T, and Patrick Bajari. “Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 1 (February 2013): 100–146. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.100.
- ID: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13