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Replication data for: Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

Resource Type
  • Fox, Jeremy T.
  • Bajari, Patrick
Publication Date
  • Abstract

    We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100 (Text)
  • Fox, Jeremy T, and Patrick Bajari. “Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 1 (February 2013): 100–146.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Fox, Jeremy T.; Bajari, Patrick (2013): Replication data for: Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset.