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Replication data for: Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions

Resource Type
  • Athey, Susan
  • Coey, Dominic
  • Levin, Jonathan
Publication Date
  • Abstract

    Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, with little efficiency cost. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design. (JEL D44, H57, L73, Q23)
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.1 (Text)
  • Athey, Susan, Dominic Coey, and Jonathan Levin. “Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 1 (February 2013): 1–27.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.5.1.1 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Athey, Susan; Coey, Dominic; Levin, Jonathan (2013): Replication data for: Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset.