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Replication data for: Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Di Porto, Edoardo
  • Persico, Nicola
  • Sahuguet, Nicolas
Publication Date
2013-02-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper studies a new strategic auditing game in which atomistic auditors maximize the success rate of audits, and provides a method to calibrate its parameters based on audit data. Calibrating the model to Italian auditing data, we provide an estimate of tax evasion based on (non-random) audit data alone. Counterfactual simulation of the model quantifies the costs and benefits of alternative auditing policies. We compare decentralized enforcement with a counterfactual "commitment policy," and compute the loss from the former. (JEL H25, H26, M42)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.35 (Text)
Publications
  • Porto, Edoardo Di, Nicola Persico, and Nicolas Sahuguet. “Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 1 (February 2013): 35–62. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.35.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.5.1.35 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Di Porto, Edoardo; Persico, Nicola; Sahuguet, Nicolas (2013): Replication data for: Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114404