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Replication data for: Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Miller, David A.
  • Rozen, Kareen
Publication Date
2014-11-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with under performance, forgiving sanctioning schemes, and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally take on more assigned tasks than they intend to complete, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility in the hands of one or two agents.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.326 (Text)
Publications
  • Miller, David A., and Kareen Rozen. “Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 4 (November 2014): 326–61. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.326.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.6.4.326 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Miller, David A.; Rozen, Kareen (2014): Replication data for: Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114424V1