Replication data for: Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program
- Ito, Koichiro
AbstractMany countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. Such policy designs create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. I investigate the implications of such policies by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program. Using household-level panel data, I find that the incentive produced precisely estimated zero treatment effects on energy conservation in coastal areas. In contrast, the rebate induced short-run and long-run consumption reductions in inland areas. Income, climate, and air conditioner saturation significantly drive the heterogeneity. Finally, I provide a cost-effectiveness analysis and investigate how to improve the policy design. (JEL D12, D62, H76, L94, L98, Q48)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130397 (Text)
Ito, Koichiro. “Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, no. 3 (August 2015): 209–37. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20130397.
- ID: 10.1257/pol.20130397 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13