Replication data for: Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth
- Johnson, Erin M.
- Rehavi, M. Marit
AbstractThis paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers' financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20140160 (Text)
Johnson, Erin M., and M. Marit Rehavi. “Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8, no. 1 (February 2016): 115–41. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140160.
- ID: 10.1257/pol.20140160 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13