Replication data for: Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India
- Hanna, Rema
- Wang, Shing-Yi
AbstractStudents in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150029 (Text)
Hanna, Rema, and Shing-Yi Wang. “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9, no. 3 (August 2017): 262–90. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150029.
- ID: 10.1257/pol.20150029 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13