Metadata

Replication data for: Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Hanna, Rema
  • Wang, Shing-Yi
Publication Date
2017-08-01
Description

  • Abstract

    Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150029 (Text)
Publications
  • Hanna, Rema, and Shing-Yi Wang. “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9, no. 3 (August 2017): 262–90. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150029.
    • ID: 10.1257/pol.20150029 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13