Replication data for: Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment
- Martinelli, César
- Parker, Susan W.
- Pérez-Gea, Ana Cristina
- Rodrigo, Rodimiro
AbstractWe use a database generated by a policy intervention that incentivized learning as measured by standardized exams to investigate empirically the relationship between cheating by students and cash incentives to students and teachers. We adapt methods from the education measurement literature to calculate the extent of cheating and show that cheating is more prevalent under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students (versus no incentives or incentives only to teachers). We provide evidence suggesting that students may have learned to cheat, with the number of cheating students per classroom increasing over time under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150066 (Text)
Martinelli, César, Susan W. Parker, Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea, and Rodimiro Rodrigo. “Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 10, no. 1 (February 2018): 298–325. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150066.
- ID: 10.1257/pol.20150066 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13