Replication data for: Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA's Clean Power Plan
- Bushnell, James B.
- Holland, Stephen P.
- Hughes, Jonathan E.
- Knittel, Christopher R.
AbstractThe EPA's Clean Power Plan sets goals for CO2 emissions rate reductions by 2030 that vary substantially across states. States can choose the regulatory mechanism they use and whether or not to join with other states in implementing their goals. We analyze incentives to adopt rate standards versus cap-and-trade with theory and simulation. We show conditions where adoption of inefficient rate standards is a dominant strategy from both consumers' and generators' perspectives. Numerical simulations of the western electricity system highlight incentives for uncoordinated policies that lower welfare and increase emissions relative to coordination.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150237 (Text)
Bushnell, James B., Stephen P. Holland, Jonathan E. Hughes, and Christopher R. Knittel. “Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA’s Clean Power Plan.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9, no. 2 (May 2017): 57–90. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150237.
- ID: 10.1257/pol.20150237 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13