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Replication data for: Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Niehaus, Paul
  • Sukhtankar, Sandip
Publication Date
2013-01-03
Description
  • Abstract

    Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents -- for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this "golden goose" effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter. (JEL D73, D82, H83, J41, K42, O17, O21)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplemented by
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.4.230 (Text)
Publications
  • Niehaus, Paul, and Sandip Sukhtankar. “Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5, no. 4 (November 2013): 230–69. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.4.230.
    • ID: 10.1257/pol.5.4.230 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2019-10-13 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2019-10-13

Niehaus, Paul; Sukhtankar, Sandip (2013): Replication data for: Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114842