Replication data for: A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
- Diermeier, Daniel
- Keane, Michael
- Merlo, Antonio
AbstractOur main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/0002828053828464 (Text)
Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo. “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers.” American Economic Review 95, no. 1 (February 2005): 347–73. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828464.
- ID: 10.1257/0002828053828464 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-06