Replication data for: Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting
- Snyder, James M., Jr.
- Ting, Michael M.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen
AbstractOrganizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825538 (Text)
Snyder, James M, Michael M Ting, and Stephen Ansolabehere. “Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting.” American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (August 2005): 981–1004. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825538.
- ID: 10.1257/0002828054825538 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-06