My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

Resource Type
  • Snyder, James M., Jr.
  • Ting, Michael M.
  • Ansolabehere, Stephen
Publication Date
  • Abstract

    Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825538 (Text)
  • Snyder, James M, Michael M Ting, and Stephen Ansolabehere. “Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting.” American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (August 2005): 981–1004.
    • ID: 10.1257/0002828054825538 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-06

Snyder, James M., Jr.; Ting, Michael M.; Ansolabehere, Stephen (2005): Replication data for: Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset.