Replication data for: Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
- Bó, Pedro Dal
AbstractWhile there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/000282805775014434 (Text)
Bó, Pedro Dal. “Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games.” American Economic Review 95, no. 5 (November 2005): 1591–1604. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805775014434.
- ID: 10.1257/000282805775014434 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-06