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Replication data for: Competition and Strategic Incentives in the Market for Credit Ratings: Empirics of the Financial Crisis of 2007

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Chu, Chenghuan Sean
  • Rysman, Marc
Publication Date
2019-10-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We study the market for ratings agencies in the commercial mortgage backed securities sector leading up to and including the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Using a structural model adapted from the auctions literature, we characterize the incentives of ratings agencies to distort ratings in favor of issuers. We find an important equilibrium distortion, which decreased after the crisis. We study several counterfactual experiments motivated by recent policymaking in this industry.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140773 (Text)
Publications
  • Chu, Chenghuan Sean, and Marc Rysman. “Competition and Strategic Incentives in the Market for Credit Ratings: Empirics of the Financial Crisis of 2007.” American Economic Review 109, no. 10 (October 1, 2019): 3514–55. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140773.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20140773 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-06

Chu, Chenghuan Sean; Rysman, Marc (2019): Replication data for: Competition and Strategic Incentives in the Market for Credit Ratings: Empirics of the Financial Crisis of 2007. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116158