Replication data for: Capital Taxation under Political Constraints
- Scheuer, Florian
- Wolitzky, Alexander
AbstractThis paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform; thus, sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. We find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for the poor and/or the middle class but are taxed for the rich. U-shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals' political behavior is purely determined by economic motives.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141081 (Text)
Scheuer, Florian, and Alexander Wolitzky. “Capital Taxation under Political Constraints.” American Economic Review 106, no. 8 (August 2016): 2304–28. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141081.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.20141081 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-06