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Replication data for: The Hidden Costs of Control

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Falk, Armin
  • Kosfeld, Michael
Publication Date
2006-12-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principalagent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principal’s controlling decision. Overall, the effect of control on the principal’s payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy. (JEL D82, Z13)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.5.1611 (Text)
Publications
  • Falk, Armin, and Michael Kosfeld. “The Hidden Costs of Control.” American Economic Review 96, no. 5 (November 2006): 1611–30. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1611.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.96.5.1611 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-07

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael (2006): Replication data for: The Hidden Costs of Control. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116246V1