My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Ongena, Steven
  • Popov, Alexander
  • Van Horen, Neeltje
Publication Date
2019-10-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Using proprietary data on banks' monthly securities holdings, we show that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds during months when the government needed to roll over a relatively large amount of maturing debt. This result cannot be explained by risk shifting, carry trading, or regulatory compliance. Domestic banks that received government support, are small, or with weaker balance sheets were particularly susceptible to "moral suasion," while governance of banks played less of a role.
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mac.20160377 (Text)
Publications
  • Ongena, Steven, Alexander Popov, and Neeltje Van Horen. “The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11, no. 4 (October 1, 2019): 346–79. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20160377.
    • ID: 10.1257/mac.20160377 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-07

Ongena, Steven; Popov, Alexander; Van Horen, Neeltje (2019): Replication data for: The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116414V1