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Replication data for: Incentive Schemes, Sorting, and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Larkin, Ian
  • Leider, Stephen
Publication Date
2012-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We investigate how the convexity of a firm's incentives interacts with worker overconfidence to affect sorting decisions and performance. We demonstrate, experimentally, that overconfident employees are more likely to sort into a nonlinear incentive scheme over a linear one, even though this reduces pay for many subjects and despite the presence of clear feedback. Additionally, the linear scheme attracts demotivated, underconfident workers who perform below their ability. Our findings suggest that firms may design incentive schemes that adapt to the behavioral biases of employees to "sort in" ("sort away") attractive (unattractive) employees; such schemes may also reduce a firm's wage bill. (JEL D03, D83, J24, J31, M12)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.2.184 (Text)
Publications
  • Larkin, Ian, and Stephen Leider. “Incentive Schemes, Sorting, and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 2 (May 2012): 184–214. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.2.184.
    • ID: 10.1257/mic.4.2.184 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-07

Larkin, Ian; Leider, Stephen (2012): Replication data for: Incentive Schemes, Sorting, and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116441