Replication data for: Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica
- Brockmeyer, Anne
- Smith, Spencer
- Hernandez, Marco
- Kettle, Stewart
AbstractThe majority of firms in developing countries are informal, yet even among registered firms, tax filing rates are low. We argue that non-filing of taxes among registered firms constitutes an important intermediate form of informality, which can be tackled cost-effectively. Using a randomized experiment in Costa Rica, we show that credible enforcement emails increased the tax payment rate (amount) by 3.4 p.p. (US$15) among previously non-filing firms. Emails that highlight third-party reports of a firm's transactions further increased compliance. The effect persisted over two years, and treated firms became more likely to report transactions with other firms, facilitating future tax enforcement.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160589 (Text)
Brockmeyer, Anne, Spencer Smith, Marco Hernandez, and Stewart Kettle. “Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 3 (August 2019): 55–87. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20160589.
- ID: 10.1257/pol.20160589 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-07