Replication data for: The Long-Run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining
- Lovenheim, Michael F.
- Willén, Alexander
AbstractWe analyze how exposure to teacher collective bargaining affects long-run outcomes for students, exploiting the timing of state duty-to-bargain law passage in a cross-cohort difference-in-difference framework. Among men, exposure to a duty-to-bargain law in the first 10 years after passage depresses annual earnings by $2,134 (3.93 percent), decreases weekly hours worked by 0.42, and reduces employment and labor force participation. The earnings estimate implies that current duty-to-bargain laws reduce earnings by $213.8 billion annually. Effects grow with time since law passage, are largest among nonwhites, and are not evident for women. Duty-to-bargain laws reduce male noncognitive skills, supporting the labor market findings.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170570 (Text)
Lovenheim, Michael F., and Alexander Willén. “The Long-Run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 3 (August 2019): 292–324. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170570.
- ID: 10.1257/pol.20170570 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-12-07