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Replication data for: Sweetening the Deal? Political Connections and Sugar Mills in India

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Sukhtankar, Sandip
Publication Date
2012-07-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Political control of firms is prevalent across the world. Evidence suggests that firms profit from political connections, and politicians derive benefit from control over firms. This paper investigates an alternative mechanism through which politicians may benefit electorally from connected firms, examining sugar mills in India. I find evidence of embezzlement in politically controlled mills during election years, reflected in lower prices paid to farmers for cane. This result complements the literature on political cycles by demonstrating how campaign funds are raised rather than used. Politicians may recompense farmers upon getting elected, possibly explaining how they can get away with pilferage. (JEL D72, G34, L66, O13, O17, Q12, Q13)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.4.3.43 (Text)
Publications
  • Sukhtankar, Sandip. “Sweetening the Deal? Political Connections and Sugar Mills in India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4, no. 3 (July 2012): 43–63. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.4.3.43.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.4.3.43 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2020-01-15

Sukhtankar, Sandip (2012): Replication data for: Sweetening the Deal? Political Connections and Sugar Mills in India. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113829V1-21823