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Replication data for: An Empirical Model of the Medical Match

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Agarwal, Nikhil
Publication Date
2014-12-30
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131006 (Text)
Publications
  • Agarwal, Nikhil. “An Empirical Model of the Medical Match.” American Economic Review 105, no. 7 (July 2015): 1939–78. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131006.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20131006 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-03-04 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-03-04

Agarwal, Nikhil (2014): Replication data for: An Empirical Model of the Medical Match. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112939V1-22763