Data and Code For: Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent

Resource Type
  • Ashraf, Nava (London School of Economics)
  • Bandiera, Oriana (London School of Economics)
  • Lee, Scott S. (Vanderbilt University)
  • Davenport, Edward (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Publication Date
  • Abstract

    We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new healthcare position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.
Temporal Coverage
  • 2010-01-01 / 2014-12-31
    Time Period: Fri Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2010--Wed Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 2014 (Various surveys and datasets, from 2010 to 2014.)
Geographic Coverage
  • Zambia
  • Is cited by
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180326 (Text)
  • Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport, and Scott S. Lee. “Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services.” American Economic Review 110, no. 5 (May 2020): 1355–94.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20180326 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2020-04-15